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RECENT CASES
DIMINISHED CAPACITY AND NON-STATUTORY INVOL-
UNTARY MANSLAUGHTER - DIMINISHED CAPACITY
DUE TO MENTAL DEFECT OR MENTAL ILLNESS CAN
REDUCE HOMICIDE TO INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGH-
TER.-People v. Long, 38 Cal. App. 3d 680, 113 Cal. Rptr. 530
(1974).
The defendant, Donald John Long, age 22, lived near the
decedent, a 73 year-old widower, in a trailer park in Yucca Valley.
The defendant and the decedent had become friends and spent
many hours together watching the decedent's television. On sev-
eral occasions the defendant had tried to borrow money from the
decedent, but without success. The decedent was found on the
floor of his living room with a belt and an electric cord wrapped
around his neck. Subsequent examination revealed numerous
facial lacerations and bruises, all of which were consistent with
the pathologist's conclusion that the decedent had been strangled.'
The day after the decedent was found strangled, the defend-
ant was arrested in Twenty-Nine Palms. At that time he had in
his possession a watch, coins and a wallet containing some two
hundred dollars in cash and credit cards belonging to the dece-
dent. After a proper Miranda warning and waiver, recorded
statements were taken from the defendant and a re-enactment of
the crime, in which the defendant participated, was filmed at a
local sheriff's substation. Both the statement and the filmed re-
enactment were consistent with Long's testimony at trial. Long
claimed that he and the decedent had been close friends and spent
many hours together; that on the night of the killing the two of
them were sitting next !to each other watching television; that the
decedent placed his hand on the defendant's leg and then grabbed
the defendant in the groin area causing severe pain; and that in
reaction to this assault the defendant picked up a large metal bolt
and struck the decedent several times. In a rage, the defendant
then wrapped a belt and a lamp cord around the decedent's neck.
Long denied having gone to the decedent's house with any
1. People v. Long, 38 Cal. App. 3d 680, 683, 113 Cal. Rptr. 530, 532
(1974).
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intention of either killing or robbing him and claimed the beating
was a reaction to the decedent'S! homosexual approach.
2 He
further claimed that the robbery was an afterthought. A psychia-
trist testified for Long, stating that because of the homosexual
approach, Long had been overcome with anger rendering him ir-
rational at the time of the beating; however, the psychiatrist be-
lieved Long -to be rational, that is, to know what he was doing,
at the time of the robbery.'
After a jury trial, Long was found guilty of first degree
murder.' He appealed on the ground that because the court
failed to instruct sua sponte on non-statutory involuntary man-
slaughter, 5 the jury's verdict was not based upon a determination
of every material issue presented by the evidence.6 The issue
presented was whether mental defect or mental illness, in the ab-
sence of evidence of intoxication, can negate intent to kill so as
to reduce homicide to involuntary manslaughter.
Justice Gardner, writing for a unanimous court, approached
this issue without retracing ,the history of the diminished capacity
partial defense. Nonetheless, the Long decision is a refinement
of a line of cases based on the principles established in the land-
2. Id. at 683, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
3. Id. at 684, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
4. CAL. PEN. CODE § 189 (West 1970).
5. In People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 385 n.1, 461 P.2d 659, 662 n.1, 82
Cal. Rptr. 379, 382 n.1, the court dealt with non-statutory manslaughter as fol-
lows:
In People v. Conley, [cite omitted], we pointed out that section 192
[manslaughter] had been adopted before the concept of diminished ca-
pacity had been developed and therefore that section's enumeration of
non-malicious criminal homicide could not be considered exclusive. We
did not thereby create a "non statutory crime," nor could we do so con-
sistently with Penal Code section 6. Rather we gave effect to the statu-
tory definition of manslaughter by recognizing that factors other than
sudden quarrel or heat of passion may render a person incapable of
harboring malice. [Emphasis by the court].
Both People v. Long, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 684, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 533 and the dis-
senting opinion of People v. Mosher, supra at 400, 461 P.2d at 673, 82 Cal. Rptr.
at 393, indicate that non-statutory manslaughter is not really a new crime, but
rather the adding of new elements to the already existing statutory definition of
manslaughter. The Long court merely defined those "factors other than sudden
quarrel or heat of passion" referred to in the Conley decision.
6. In People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1963), the court established the rule that in a first degree murder case, failure
to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses will constitute a "miscarriage of
justice," and therefore violate Article VI, section 4/2 (section 13 in the 1966 re-
vision) of the California Constitution. In People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 518
P.2d 913, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974), the court rejected the Modesto reversible per
se rule in favor of a rule which required the defendant to be prejudiced by the
court's failure to give the proper jury instructions. See Smith, Reversible Error
in First Degree Murder Convictions: The Modesto Rule Re-Examined, 7 U.S.F.L.
REv. (1972).
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mark case of People v. Wells 7 and its progeny.8  Factual situa-
tions, however, seldom arise in which a diminished capacity
defense based solely on mental defect or mental illness could be-
come an issue; therefore there were no compelling precedents9
upon which the court could base its decision.
The court in Long relied heavily on dictum from People v.
Mosher, where the jury was instructed that the defendant could
not be convicted of murder if malice was rebutted by diminished
capacity.' ° Rather than instructing the jury on non-statutory man-
slaughter, 1 the trial court in Mosher proceeded to instruct on
statutory manslaughter," that is, it excluded non-statutory ele-
ments, which precluded the jury from consideration of man-
slaughter as the offense for which the defendant could be con-
victed.
It has been established that when there is sufficient evidence
of diminished capacity to negate the requisite elements in a homi-
cide,"3 the court should instruct the jury sua sponte on non-stat-
utory manslaughter.'4  Many homicide cases-particularly thoseinvolving intoxication-have followed the doctrine that malice can
be rebutted by showing that the defendant's mental capacity was
sufficiently diminished to preclude his harboring malice. 5 Other
7. 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).8. Wells held that on the trial of the issues raised by a plea of not guiltyto a charge of a crime which requires proof of a specific mental state, competent
evidence of mental abnormality, not amounting to legal insanity, may be intro-duced to show that a defendant lacked the specific mental state, but evidence per-
taining to insanity is inadmissible.
Ten years later in People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959),the court affirmed its holding in Wells creating the Wells-Gorshen rule. Later,in People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966),the Wells-Gorshen rule was put into its contemporary form and has since been
referred to as "diminished capacity." See, Comment, Keeping Wolff From theDoor: California's Diminished Capacity Concept, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1641(1972); Comment, The Defense of Diminished Capacity, 3 LINCOLN L. REv. 188(1968); 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 349 (1972); and Student Symposium on the Pro-posed California Criminal Code, Insanity, Intoxication and Diminished Capacity
under the Proposed California Criminal Code, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 550 (1972).9. rn People v. Schindler, 23 Cal. App. 3d 369, 376, 100 Cal. Rptr. 110,114 (1972), the court stated that:
Neither counsel nor we have been able to find a case not involving in-toxication which holds that diminished capacity to form an intent tokill can reduce a homicide to involuntary manslaughter [footnotes
omitted].
10. 1 Cal. 3d 379, 390, 461 P.2d 659, 665, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379, 385 (1972).
11. See note 5 supra.
12. CAL. PEN. CODE § 192 (West 1970).
13. The elements of homicide, both murder and manslaughter, are set forth
in CALJIC 8.77 (1974 Revision).
14. People v. Castillo, 70 Cal. 2d 264, 270, 449 P.2d 449, 452, 74 Cal. Rptr.385, 388 (1969); People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 490-94, 386 P.2d 677,681-84, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 82-84 (1963); People v. Aubrey, 253 Cal. App. 2d 913,920, 61 Cal. Rptr. 772, 777 (1967).
15. People v. Castillo, 70 Cal. 2d 264, 266, 449 P.2d 449, 449, 74 Cal. Rptr.
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cases, extending the doctrine, have suggested that not only malice,
but also intent to kill, may be rebutted by a showing of diminished
capacity."6 No case prior to Long has held that diminished
capacity due to mental defect or illness 7 may reduce murder to
involuntary manslaughter, without proof of sufficient intoxica-
tion."
The Long court cited Mosher,'9 in which the supreme court
reversed a conviction of first degree murder, stating that the trial
court had:
[P]roceeded to define involuntary manslaughter in such a
way as to exclude the jury's consideration of involuntary
manslaughter as the offense for which the jury should find
defendant guilty if it determined that the defendant's mental
capacity was diminished due to mental defect, mental illness,
or intoxication such that the intent to kill as well as malice
was rebutted. 20
The court in Long viewed the statement in Mosher as dic-
tum, because the defendant in that case had had a number of
drinks prior to -the murder in question. Viewing the statement
as dictum, however, overlooks facts showing Mosher's past psychi-
atric condition and treatment, which might well have indicated
that his mental capacity had been diminished by a mental defect
or mental illness rather than by unconsciovsness due to intoxica-
tion.2 '
385, 385 (1969); People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 316-18, 411 P.2d 911, 914-
16, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 818-20 (1966).
16. People v. Mosher, I Cal. 3d 379, 390-91, 461 P.2d 659, 666, 82 Cal. Rptr.
379, 386 (1969); People v. Graham, 71 Cal. 2d 303, 316, 455 P.2d 153, 161,
78 Cal. Rptr. 217, 225 (1969); cf. People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d
911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
17. See note 9 supra.
18. In People v. Roy, 18 Cal. App. 3d 537, 549, 95 Cal. Rptr. 884, 891
(1971), the court took the position that to support a finding of involuntary man-
slaughter based on voluntary intoxication, such voluntary intoxication must reach
the state of unconsciousness.
19. People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 461 P.2d 659, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1969).
20. Id. at 390, 461 P.2d at 666, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 386. [Emphasis added].
21. The editors of CALJIC 8.48 and 8.77 (1971) formulated a jury instruc-
tion based on what they interpreted as the holding in Mosher. In CALJIC 8.77
the court instructs the jury on diminished capacity as it relates to the ability to
premeditate, deliberate, harbor malice, or intent to kill. The instruction reads,
in part, as follows:
[Ilf you find that his mental capacity was diminished to the extent that
he neither harbored malice aforethought nor had an intent to kill at the
time the alleged crime was committed, you cannot find him guilty of ei-
ther murder or voluntary manslaughter.
After CALJIC 8.77 is given, the editors suggest that CALJIC 8.48 should
be given to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter. CALIIC 8.48 states:
Involuntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice aforethought and without an intent to kill.




In the instant case, there was no indication of intoxication
from any source. The court of appeal was forced to consider
whether the requisite "intent to kill" for homicide could be ne-gated by mental defect or mental illness alone. In deciding this
issue the Long court held:
[I]f there is substantial evidence of mental illness or mental
defect sufficient to negate the ability of the defendant topremeditate, to deliberate, to harbor malice aforethought or
to form an intent to kill, it is the duty of the trial judge to in-
struct the jury sua sponte that the offense can be no greater
than involuntary manslaughter.22
In support of its holding the Long court stated:
While. . .there have been no cases directly involving mentalillness or mental defect, we can find no rational distinction
between those situations and that of unconsciousness resulting
from voluntary intoxication.23
Two questions arise in applying the Long holding to a factual
situation: (1) was there substantial evidence of mental illness or
mental defect; and (2) was -this evidence sufficient so as to alert
the trial judge -to the necessity of issuing a sua sponte jury instruc-
tion on non-statutory involuntary manslaughter?
The court decided that the evidence, including Long's own
statement, "In my mind I was trying to kill him," was insufficient
to require the issuance of a sua sponte instruction on non-statutory
involuntary manslaughter. 24  In response to the question of what
quantum of evidence is to be required for the issuance of the sua
sponte jury instruction on non-statutory manslaughter, the court
explained only that the facts in the instant case were insufficient.
(1) During the commission of a misdemeanor which is in-herently dangerous to human life; or(2) In the commission of an act ordinarily lawful which in-volves a high degree of risk of death or great bodily harm, withoutdue caution and circumspection.
There is no malice aforethought and intent to kill if by reasonof diminished capacity caused by mental illness, mental defect, orintoxication, the defendant did not have the mental capacity to har-bor malice aforethought and to form an intent to kill.22. People v. Long, 38 Cal. App. 3d 680, 685, 113 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (1974)(Emphasis the court's).
23. Id. at 686, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 534 (Emphasis the court's).24. Id. at 686, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 534-35. It should be noted, however, thathad such a jury instruction been requested, the amount of evidence here mighthave been sufficient. The distinction arises from the quantum of proof requiredto support a sua sponte instruction as opposed to a requested one. For a suasponte jury instruction there must be substantial evidence that diminished capacityis an issue in the case before the trial judge has a duty to issue an instruction.If a defendant requests an instruction, however, it must be issued if there is any
evidence on diminished capacity deserving of any consideration whatsoever, re-gardless of how incredible that evidence may be. See People v. Cram, 12 Cal.
App. 3d 37, 90 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1970).
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It is well established that the difference between diminished
capacity and unconsciousness is one of degree only:
[W]here the former provides a "partial defense" by negating
a specific mental state essential to a particular crime, 'the lat-
ter is a "complete defense" because it negates capacity to
commit any crime at all.
2 5
In the instant case, not only did the defendant not claim that
he was unconscious, but he displayed total recollection of the
crime, a traditional indicium of consciousness.26
The Long court did not explain what would constitute suf-
ficient diminished capacity to negate intent to kill, absent evidence
of unconsciousness resulting from voluntary intoxication. One
would presume that the standards for application of the dimin-
ished capacity in Long must be analogous to those for applying
diminished capacity due to unconsciousness resulting from volun-
tary intoxication. However, distinctions arise which indicate that
the standards for applying the two types of diminished capacity
must be different.2 7  In diminished capacity cases involving volun-
tary intoxication, the element of volition connotes a degree of cul-
pability which distinguishes the resulting unconsciousness from
that which is arrived at through involuntary means under the total
defense of unconsciousness.2" In diminished capacity cases aris-
25. People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 377, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394, 406. See
CAL. PEN. CODE § 26 (West 1970). Some difficulty may occur however. See
CALJIC 4.30 (1971) which states:
This rule . . . [unconsciousness defense] . . . applies only to cases of
the unconsciousness of persons of sound mind as, for example, somnam-
bulists or persons suffering from the delirium of fever, epilepsy, a blow
on the head or the involuntary taking of drugs or intoxicating liquor,
and other cases in which there is no functioning of the conscious mind
and the person's acts are controlled solely by the subconscious mind.
CALJIC 4.30 implies that the important feature is one of volition. It is this
volitional element which precludes unconsciousness arising from voluntary intoxi-
cation from being a complete defense; however, any such volitional element is
lacking in the case of diminished capacity arising from mental defect or mental
illness.
26. See People v. Heffington, 32 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9-10, 107 Cal. Rptr. 859,
865-66 (1973).
27. The two types of diminished capacity are: (1) that arising from uncon-
sciousness due to voluntary intoxication; and (2) that arising from mental illness
or mental defect.
28. In People v. Graham, 71 Cal. 2d 303, 316-17, 445 P.2d 153, 161, 78
Cal. Rptr. 217, 255 (1969), the court dealt with unconsciousness from voluntary
intoxication as follows:
[T]he requisite elements of criminal negligence is deemed to exist irre-
spective of unconsciousness, and a defendant stands guilty of involuntary
manslaughter if he voluntarily procured his own intoxication.
The Graham court took the position that a defendant who is unconscious due
to voluntary intoxication assumes the risk that he will commit acts which are in-
herently dangerous to life and limb. It strains logic to apply this approach to
culpability in cases of diminished capacity arising from mental illness or defect,
since there is no volitional act or assumption of risk on the part of the defendant.
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ing from mental illness or mental defect, there is no element of
volition to which culpability may attach. Therefore, in cases of
diminished capacity due to mental illness or defect, if unconscious-
ness is the level to which a defendant's capacity must be dimin-
ished to negate intent to kill, there is no apparent distinction be-
tween this type of diminished capacity and the defense of uncon-
sciousness.2
It is apparent that the court's holding in Long is the next
logical step in the refinement of the Wells-Gorshen rule,"° but
what is not so apparent is the degree of mental defect or the ex-
tent of mental illness necessary to negate a defendant's ability to
form intent to kill. Furthermore, extending diminished capacity
to cases in which intent to kill is negated by mental illness or de-
fect is useless unless the standard for application of the defense
can be distinguished from the already existing defenses of uncon-
sciousness and insanity.
In People v. Newton,"' the court took a broad view of uncon-
sciousness. Such a view limits the factual situations in which
diminished capacity might be held to negate malice, without fall-
ing into an area covered by the defenses of insanity and uncon-
sciousness. The court in the Newton case noted that:
[Unconsciousness] . . . need not reach the physical dimen-
sions commonly associated with the term (coma, inertia, in-
capability of locomotion or manual action, and so on); it can
exist. . . where the subject physically acts in -fact but is not,
at the time, conscious of acting. 2
It seems quite likely that if Long had not stated that at the
time of the murder he was trying to kill the decedent, and if his
recollection of the events surrounding the crime were not so clear,
the problem of distinguishing between diminished capacity and
unconsciousness might well have been at issue. As the court
points out, however, under the defendant's own version of the
facts, he could be guilty of nothing less than voluntary man-
slaughter.13
People v. Long will be important for the defense practitioner
confronted with the fact situation in which the defendant is legally
sane, but has acted in a manner, short of unconsciousness, which
29. It should be noted that in People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 379,
87 Cal. Rptr. 394, 407 (1970) the court stated: "Mhe defenses of diminished
capacity and unconsciousness [are] 'entirely separate,' and neither incompatible
nor mutually exclusive ... "
30. See note 8 supra.
31. 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970).
32. Id. at 376, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 405.




might arguably negate the requisite "intent to kill" for homicide.
The court in Long, exercising judicial restraint, gave little insight
into the extent to which a defendant's capacity must be impaired
to succeed in reducing homicide to involuntary manslaughter due
to diminished capacity arising from mental illness or mental de-
fect. Nevertheless, the court's approach leads the practitioner to
two important conclusions: (1) that the diminished capacity de-
fense arising from mental defect or mental illness should not be
overlooked in future cases; and (2) that the standard for requiring
the sua sponte jury instruction on this defense will have to come
from a future case in which the court feels compelled to apply
this type of diminished capacity.
This new aspect of the diminished capacity partial defense
will give the defense attorney more flexibility in cases where he
doubts his client can meet the rigid test of the insanity defense,
where there is no evidence of unconsciousness due to voluntary
intoxication, and where he does not believe-because of the na-
ture of the offense committed and other practical considerations-
that a defense of unconsciousness will succeed.
Phillip M. Adleson
CHOICE OF LAW-WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION-GOV-
ERNMENTAL INTEREST ANALYSIS REQUIRES DELINE-
ATION OF STATE POLICIES AND LIMITATION ON
DAMAGES CONCERNS ONLY RESIDENT DEFENDANTS -
Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 106 (1974).
In January, 1969, Manuel Cid Hurtado was operating an
automobile in California when it collided with another vehicle.
Both drivers were California residents and both vehicles were
registered in California. Antonio Hurtado, a cousin to Manuel
and passenger in his vehicle, died from injuries received in the
collision. Antonio, a resident and domiciliary of the State of
Zacatecas, Mexico, was a temporary visitor in California. Antonio's
widow and children, residents of Zacatecas and the real parties in
interest, commenced a wrongful death action against both drivers
in California.
Pursuant to Evidence Code sections 4521 and 453,2 the trial
1. CAL. EviD. CODE § 452 (West 1973) states in relevant part:
1974]
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court granted defendant Hurtado's request that it take judicial no-
tice of the rule of the State of Zacatecas on the limitation on re-
covery in wrongful death actions.3 However, the trial court ruled
that it would apply a measure of damages in accordance with the
California law4 and not Mexican law.
The defendant sought a writ of mandamus from the court
of appeal5 to direct the trial court to vacate its decision and insti-
tute in its place a ruling that would apply -the Mexican limitation
on damages.6 The court of appeal issued the peremptory writ
of mandamus.
The court predicated its decision to apply the Mexican rule
limiting the damages recoverable upon the supreme court's opin-
ion of Reich v. Purcell.7  In that case the court was confronted
Judicial notice may be taken of the following matters to the extent
that they are not embraced within 451:
(f) The law of an organization of nations and of foreign nations and
public entities in foreign nations.
2. CAL. Evw. CODE § 453 (West 1973) states in relevant part:
The trial court shall take judicial notice of any matter specified in Sec-
tion 452 if a party requests it and:(a) gives each adverse party sufficient notice of the request, through
the pleadings or otherwise, to enable such adverse party to pre-
pare to meet the request; and(b) furnishes the court with sufficient information to enable it to takejudicial notice of the matter.
3. The trial court took judicial notice of:
Section 1889 of the Civil Code of the State of Zacatecas, Mexico, pro-
vided that a decedent's survivors may receive a maximum of 25 pesos
per day for a period of 730 days. This section expressly makes the Fed-
eral Labor Law (of Mexico) applicable in determining the amount of
damages recoverable in wrongful death actions. Section 1890 of the
Zacatecas Civil Code provides that the court may, in its discretion,
award an additional amount, not to exceed one third of the first amount,
as extra indemnity.
Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 578 n.1, 522 P.2d 666, 668 n.1, 114
Cal. Rptr. 106, 108 n.1 (1974).
4. CAL. CIrV. PRO. CODE § 377 (West 1973) states in part:
When the death of a person not being a minor . . . is caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs . . . may maintain an action
for damages against the person causing the death. . . . If any other
person is responsible for any such wrongful act or neglect, the action
may also be maintained against such other person. . . . In every action
under this section, such damages may be given as under all circum-
stances of the case may be just ...
5. Hurtado v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1974), vacated.
6. Since a trial court is under a legal duty to apply the proper law it may
be directed to perform that duty by a writ of mandamus. See Babb v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 851, 479 P.2d 379, 385, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 185 (1971);
Mannheim v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 678, 685, 478 P.2d 17, 20, 91 Cal. Rptr.
585, 588 (1970).
7. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
In Reich, the supreme court of California was confronted with a choice-of-
law problem as to the measure of damages in a wrongful death action. The court
found that only Ohio had any state interest in the application of its unlimited
recovery rule in a wrongful death action based upon a collision involving a Cal-
ifornia resident and an Ohio resident in Missouri. The supreme court adopted
1974] CHOICE OF LAW
with a choice-of-law problem as to the measure of damages in a
wrongful death action. The court renounced its prior holding that
in tort actions the law of the place-of-the-wrong governed all sub-
stantive matters relating to the cause of action., The court
adopted in its place the concept of governmental interest analy-
sis.' This approach requires an analysis of the interests of the
states involved, the objective of which is "to determine the law
that most appropriately applies to the issue involved."' 10  The
central focus of an interest analysis is the interpretation of the sub-
stantive rule in respect to its purpose in light of the state's con-
cern for the issue and the character of -the tort."
the governmental interest analysis approach to resolve the choice-of-law problem
between the Missouri and Ohio rules of damages. The court chose not to apply
the law of the California forum because it declared that its state interest was ab-
sent. California did not have a state interest in protecting the defendant because
its law did not protect him by a limitation of damages. The court held, that,
since the defendant was not a Missouri resident, Missouri had no interest in ex-
tending its limitation on recovery to the defendant. The court characterized the
Missouri concern as primarily local and therefore did not include a California de.
fendant. In the absence of a competing state interest, the court applied the un-
limited recovery rule of Ohio in order to give effect to Ohio's policies of awarding
full recovery to injured plaintiffs.
For a scholarly discussion of Reich, see Symposium-Comments on Reich v.
Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 551 (1968).
8. Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 555, 432 P.2d 727, 730, 63 Cal. Rptr.
31, 34 (1967), overruling Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 10 P.2d 63 (1932),
and Ryan v. North Alaska Salmon Co., 153 Cal. 438, 95 P. 862 (1908).
9. The late Professor Brainerd Currie was a notable advocate of interest
analysis. He postulated that in a choice-of-law selection a court must analyze
the policies that are the foundation of the rules being considered for application.
In the absence of congressional legislation in choice-of-law, which Currie pre-
ferred, he offered five guidelines to be considered in an interest analysis: (1)
normally, even in cases that involve foreign elements, a court should be expected
as a matter of course to apply the law of the forum; (2) when the law of a foreign
state is timely invoked by a litigant, the court should determine the governmental
policy expressed in the forum. The court should also inquire whether there is
a reasonable basis for asserting an interest of a state in the application of its law;
(3) the court should apply the law of the interested state if it finds that only
one state has a legitimate basis for the application of its policy under the circum-
stances; (4) if the court finds an apparent conflict between the interests of the
two states it should reconsider, since a more restrained interpretation of the poli-
cies may avoid the conflict; (5) if the forum is disinterested, but an unavoidable
conflict exists between the interests of two other states, and the court cannot de-
cline an adjudication of the case, then the law of the forum should apply, at least
if it corresponds with the law of one of the other states.
See Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959
DUKE L.J. 171, 178. See generally B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1963).
10. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 555, 432 P.2d 727, 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 34, citing Lef-
lar, Choice-influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267,
279-82 (1966). Leflar's analysis of proper choice-of-law rules is founded upon
five factors which serve as values that could act as guides to the courts in a choice-
of-law process. He ranks the advancement of the forum's governmental interest
as fourth in priority in a court's consideration of the proper choice-of-law.
11. Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 731, 101 Cal. Rptr.
314, 328 (1972).
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Interest analysis requires that when a litigant invokes foreignlaw, the forum must inquire whether the foreign state's interest
would be advanced before applying any state's law to the facts. 12
As the supreme court said in Hurtado:
When -the forum undertakes to resolve a choice-of-law prob-lem presented to it by the litigants, it does not choose between
foreign law and its own law, but selects the appropriate rule
of decision to apply as its law to the case before it.13
Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the invoking party to demon-
strate that the rule of decision will further the interest of the for-
eign state.' 4
Underlying the interest analysis theory is the assumption that
a state has a governmental interest in its residents and in the ap-plication of its laws for their protection. The forum applies its
own law when its relation to the case is a reasonable basis for
applying that law. A reasonable basis exists either when the for-
eign state has no interest or when neither state has an interest
in the application of its law. If the forum finds that its state has
no interest, but that the foreign state does, then the foreign law
should apply. 15
In Hurtado, the court of appeal stated that it was obliged to
reach its decision because of certain guidelines set out in Reich.'6
The court concluded that only the domicile of the decedent andhis survivors had an interest in having its law prevail on the issue
of the amount of damages recoverable in a wrongful death ac-
tion.'7
Reviewing the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court, in
a unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Sullivan, denied the
writ.' 8 The court held that the California measure of damages
should apply because Mexico had no interest in the application
12. Hurtado v. Superior Court, II Cal. 3d 574, 578, 522 P.2d 666, 670, 114Cal. Rptr. 106, 110 (1974), citing B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CON-FLICTS OF LAWS 1-76, 177-87 (1963); Symposium-Comments on Reich v. Pur-
cell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 551 (1968).
13. 11 Cal. 3d 574, 581, 522 P.2d 666, 670, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106, 110.
14. Id.
15. See note 9 supra.
16. Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).The Reich opinion contained two statements which on their face appear to supportthe issuance of the writ of mandamus: First, "[S]ince California has no limita-tion of damages, it also has no interest in applying its law on behalf of defendant."Second, "[T]he interest of a state in a wrongful death action insofar as plaintiffs
are concerned is in determining the distribution of proceeds to the beneficiaries
and that interest extends only to local decedents and beneficiaries." Id. at 556,
432 P.2d at 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 35.17. Hurtado v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. Rptr. 591, 596 (1974), vacated.18. Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 578, 522 P.2d 666, 668, 114Cal. Rptr. 106, 108 (1974).
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of its limitation of damages rule to the case. 9
The supreme court declared that the defendant's contention
reflected a serious misreading of Reich because he confused what
the Reich court characterized as two completely independent state
interests: 20 first, California's interest in creating a cause of action
for wrongful death so as to provide some recovery for injured
plaintiffs; 2' and second, the interest of Zacatecas in limiting that
recovery. 22 The court noted that "in Reich this court carefully
separated these two state interests . *."..- The defendant's po-
sition, which had been adopted by the court of appeal, rested upon
an erroneous interpretation of certain language in Reich suggest-
ing that only resident plaintiffs may utilize California's unlimited
recovery rule.24 Hurtado provided the opportunity to rectify this
misreading of Reich as well as to affirm California's deterrent pol-
icy of full compensation.25
In deciding Hurtado, the supreme court delineated the state
interest underlying the wrongful death laws of the two juris-
dictions involved. As the place-of-the-wrong, California had
three distinct policies or interests supporting the unlimited dam-
ages rule incorporated in the wrongful death statute. These state
interests were: the compensation of survivors, the deterrence of
wrongful conduct, and the limitation, or lack thereof, upon the
damages recoverable. 26  It observed that Reich recognized that
these interests are primarily local in character.27
In applying the interests of California to the facts of the case,
the court found that since the plaintiffs were not California resi-
dents, the policy of compensating local survivors did not pertain.
However, the court held that the policies of deterring wrongful
conduct and of strengthening this deterrence aspect in a civil ac-
tion by imposing unlimited liability required the application of
California law.28
The court also pointed out that the limitation on recovery of
Zacatecas "modifies the sanction imposed by a countervailing con-
cern to protect local defendants against excessive financial bur-
dens for the conduct sought to be deterred."2 9 The Mexican rule





24. See note 16 supra.







demonstrates a state concern for the protection of the economic
integrity of all Mexican wrongful death action defendants. Since
the defendant was not a Mexican resident, his contention that a
Mexican law of limitation was available to him was without justifi-
cation, for he was not within the class to be protected. The
court's holding that Zacatecas' interest was local in nature signi-
fies that Zacatecas had no state interest in applying its limitation
to non-residents. Moreover, the court stated that Zacatecas had
no interest in denying full recovery to its residents injured by non-
Mexican defendants. 30  Therefore, the California measure of
damages law was properly applied by the trial court in the absence
of any compelling Mexican interest.3"
One of the most significant products of interest analysis in
choice-of-law is the identification of false conflicts--cases which
appear to involve conflicts of state laws but in which only one state
has an interest in the application of its law to the issue.3 2 Reich
and Hurtado are prime examples of false conflict analysis by the
supreme court. Hurtado has reaffirmed the principle which
emerged in Reich: if in a multi-state context only one state has
an interest in having its law applied, then there is no conflict of
laws, and that state's law should apply.
In Hurtado, the supreme court determined the interests of
California in a wrongful death action arising out of tortious con-
duct within that state. It narrowed the holding in Reich by adding
an additional element-the fact that defendant's tortious conduct
took place in California. Thus it appears that a California forum
will apply its unlimited recovery rule when a California resident
commits tortious conduct which takes life within that state.
However, the court did not indicate what the proper choice
should be where California is a neutral and convenient forum hav-
ing no interest in the application of its own law, and where ,the
court must select between the competing interests of two other
states.3 3  Presumably, as a disinterested forum, it would have to
30. 11 Cal. 3d 574, 581, 522 P.2d 666, 670, 110 Cal. Rptr. 106, 110-11.
31. Id.
32. "False conflict" may also identify the situation in which the competing
rules would yield the same result. See Comment, False Conflicts, 55 CALIF. L.
REV. 74, 77 (1967).
33. The supreme court has not encountered a factual situation where Califor-
nia's law is dissimilar to the laws of the other states in an interest analysis. InReich the court indicated that California was a disinterested forum, but it is argu-
able that it was not as neutral as it claimed because the recovery law of Ohio
was identical to that of California. Such circumstances certainly reinforce thepremise that forum law should be applied as the rule of decision in a case.
The court in Hurtado took note of Ryan v. Clark Equipment Co., 268 Cal.App. 2d 679, 74 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1969). In Ryan a California court undertook
an interest analysis to select an Oregon limitation on recovery rule instead of an
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balance the two competing states' rules. One possibility would
be to apply the law of the forum. 4 Another possibility would
be to choose the law of one of the competing states. But it is
uncertain whether this second process would be entirely satisfac-
tory since it would in fact necessitate the formulation of a stand-
ard to which comparisons of the state interests could be independ-
ently made. 35  It is suggested that a state's policies cannot be
juxtaposed with interests of other states, because the latter's con-
cern can only be deduced from an unannounced standard or from
the very rule which is to be ascertained by the proposed weighing
of interests.3 6 Subsequent case law should give definition to the
balancing aspect involved in such circumstances. The court will
have to announce some standard which is to be upheld in every
choice-of-law problem or provide further direction in the pro-
cedures of weighing state interests.
Clifford Kerry Fields
CRIMINAL LAW-CREDIT FOR PRESENTENCE TIME-
DENYING RETROACTIVE EFFECT TO A STATUTE
GRANTING CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED IN CUSTODY
PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF PRISON SENTENCE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL-in re Kapperman, 11 Cal. 3d 542, 522
P. 2d 657, 114 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1974); In re Grey, 11 Cal. 3d 554,
552 P. 2d 644, 114 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1974).
In June of 1971, petitioner Donald L. Kapperman pleaded
guilty to two counts of armed robbery.' He was sentenced on each
count to the term prescribed by law: five years to life,2 the terms
to run concurrently. Petitioner did not appeal. The term of im-
prisonment fixed by the judgment in a criminal action commences
unlimited recovery rule of Michigan. The Hurtado court agreed with the applica-
tion of the Oregon law, but disapproved of the Ryan court's identification of the
Oregon state interest. The Ryan court had misread Reich and found that limita-
tions of damages are concerned with compensation of survivors. The Hurtado
opinion provides no guidance as to how California courts, acting as neutral and
convenient forums as in the Ryan setting, are to balance the competing state in-
terests.
34. See note 9 supra.
35. See A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 350 (1962).
36. Id.
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 211 (West 1970).
2. Id. § 213.
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to run only upon the actual delivery of the defendant into the cus-
tody of the Director of Corrections.3 Kapperman petitioned di-
rectly to the California Supreme Court4 for a writ of habeas
corpus, seeking credit on his term for the 304 days he remained
in custody between the time of his arrest and his delivery into
prison.5
In 1971, the California Legislature enacted section 2900.5 of
the Penal Code,' which gives persons convicted of felony offenses
credit on their prison sentences for time served in custody prior
to the commencement of their sentences. Subdivision (c) of sec-
tion 2900.5 makes the statute prospective only, limiting its applic-
ation to those persons delivered into the custody of the Director
of Corrections on or after March 4, 1972, the effective date of
the section.7 Petitioner, having entered prison before March 4,
1972, would not be entitled to such credit.
The court declared subdivision (c) of section 2900.5 uncon-
stitutional.8 It did not, however, invalidate the entire statute.
Only the discriminatory classification set forth in subdivision (c)
was eliminated, and the statutory benefits extended to those per-
sons whom the Legislature had improperly excluded.'
3. Id. § 2900.
4. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 10 provides in pertinent part: "The Supreme Court,
courts of appeal, superior courts, and their judges have original jurisdiction in ha-
beas corpus proceedings."
5. Although the traditional function of the writ of habeas corpus is to effect
the discharge of a person unlawfully confined, the writ is also available for the
purpose of vindicating rights of a lawfully confined prisoner. In re Harrell, 2
Cal. 3d 675, 682, 470 P.2d 640, 643, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504, 507 (1970).
6. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2900.5 (West Supp. 1974) reads:
(a) In all felony convictions, either by plea or by verdict, when
the defendant has been in custody in any city, county, or city and county
jail, all days of custody of the defendant from the date of arrest to the
date on which the serving of the sentence imposed commences, including
days served as a condition of probation in compliance with a court order,
shall be credited upon his sentence, or credited to any fine which may
be imposed, at the rate of not less than twenty dollars ($20) per day,
or more, in the discretion of the court imposing the sentence. If the
total number of days in custody exceeds the number of days of the sen-
tence to be imposed, the entire sentence shall be deemed to have been
served. In any case where the court has imposed both a prison sentence
and a fine, any days to be credited to the defendant shall first be ap-
plied to the sentence imposed, and thereafter such remaining days, if
any, shall be applied to the fine.
(b) For purposes of this section, credit shall be given only where
the custody to be credited is attributable to charges arising from the
same criminal act or acts for which the defendant has been convicted.
(c) This section shall be applicable only to those persons who are
delivered into the custody of the Director of Corrections on or after the
effective date of this section.
7. Id. § 2900.5(c).




The court held that the basic guarantees of equal protection
embodied in the fourteenth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution,'" and the uniform general laws" and privileges and im-
munities' 2 sections of the California Constitution prohibit the
State from arbitrarily discriminating against persons subject to its
jurisdiction. Classifications made by the Legislature between
those to whom the State accords or withholds substantial benefits
must be reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose.13
The majority opinion by Justice Burke applies well estab-
lished principles of equal protection to a classification which nec-
essarily is created whenever the Legislature enacts a law specify-
ing that it shall not apply retroactively. In general terms these
principles require that general laws must operate uniformly on all
persons in the same category.'" Although the Legislature has
broad discretion in making statutory classifications, such classifi-
cations must be reasonable, not arbitrary.'5 The test is whether
the classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state
interest. This test is often alternatively expressed as a require-
ment that the classification be reasonably related to the object
which the legislation seeks to accomplish.'"
The legislative objective in enacting Penal Code section
2900.5 was to reduce the inequities of the bail system. Indigent
10. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I states in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
11. CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 11 states: "All laws of a general nature shall have
a uniform operation."
12. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 21 states:
No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may
not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citi-
zen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon
the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens.
13. In re Kapperman, 11 Cal. 3d 542, 545, 522 P.2d 657, 659, 114 Cal. Rptr.
97, 99 (1974), citing Hayes v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 216, 223, 490 P.2d 1137,
1140, 98 Cal. Rptr. 449, 453 (1971); In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 303, 486
P.2d 1201, 1207, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1971); In re King, 3 Cal. 3d 226, 232, 474
P.2d 983, 987, 90 Cal. Rptr. 15, 19 (1970).
14. Leland v. Lowrey, 26 Cal. 2d 224, 232, 157 P.2d 639, 645 (1945); Ex
parte Smith, 38 Cal. 702, 710 (1869).
15. Dribin v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 345, 352, 231 P.2d 809, 813 (1951).
See B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 287-88 (1972).
16. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1971); McDonald
v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). See M. FoRKoscH,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 520 (2d ed. 1969); Developments in the Law-Equal Pro-
tection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1077-87 (1969). See also B. SCHWARTZ, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 291-94 (1972); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1087-1132 (1969) for discussions of the more strict "com-
pelling interest" test employed for those classifications deemed suspect or im-
pinging on fundamental rights.
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defendants awaiting trial must remain in jail while more affluent
persons can secure their liberty. While section 2900.5 does not
eliminate this injustice, it at least guarantees that upon conviction
all persons will serve an equal total period of incarceration regard-
less of their economic status.
The rationale implicit in Kapperman is that granting or with-
holding the benefits of section 2900.5 according to a prisoner's
date of imprisonment clearly has no reasonable relationship to this
legislative purpose or -to any other legitimate state interest.
After holding that such a legitimate state interest is required,
the Kapperman court proceeded to dismiss as inadequate four al-
leged state interests offered by the People to justify a purely pros-
pective application of the statute. Primarily, the People contended
that retroactive application of section 2900.5 would interfere with
the effective operation of -the Indeterminate Sentence Law.17
The People argued that the Adult Authority 8 cannot observe the
prisoner during his presentence custody, and since rehabilitative
facilities at county jails are inferior to those in state prisons, pre-
sentence jail credit for all present inmates would undermine the
ability of the Adult Authority to make a reasoned judgment re-
garding rehabilitation.19
This argument is founded on faulty reasoning. The com-
parative quality of rehabilitative facilities in local jails and state
prisons, and the lack of opportunity for Adult Authority observa-
tion of jail inmates were immaterial to the issue before the court.
These same considerations apply to inmates who entered prison af-
ter March 4, 1972; yet the Legislature, by enacting section 2900.5,
elected to waive such considerations with respect to these inmates.
The issue was not whether this waiver is proper, but rather wheth-
er it ought to apply equally to all inmates regardless of the date
of their entry into prison. The People's argument attacked the
wisdom of the statute, rather than its retroactive application, and
was properly rejected by the court.2"
In addition, the Kapperman court noted that the sentencing
17. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1168 (West 1970).
18. The Adult Authority is the parole board for male prisoners in California.
The Authority consists of nine members appointed by the Governor for four year
terms. CAL. PEN. CODE § 5075 (West 1970).
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of 1917, the court in imposing sen-
tence does not fix the term or duration of the period of imprisonment. Id.
§ 1168. Except for certain felonies carrying a mandatory life sentence, a mini-
mum and maximum term of imprisonment is fixed by statute for each offense.
After a defendant is sentenced by the court according to the statutory term pre-
scribed for his offense, he is delivered into the custody of the Director of Correc-
tions. Id. § 1202a. The actual term which the prisoner will serve is thereafter
fixed, and may be refixed, by the Adult Authority. Id. §§ 3020, 3021.
19. 11 Cal. 3d at 546, 522 P.2d at 659, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
20. Id. at 547, 522 P.2d at 660, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
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procedure in California is such that retroactive granting of presen-
tence jail credit rarely will usurp the discretion of the Adult Au-
thority:
[T]he credit operates only to reduce the statutory maxi-
mum and minimum commitment -terms, but ordinarily would
not interfere with the Adult Authority's discretion in setting
the actual parole release date. The credit will advance the
parole eligibility date, but would require premature release
only in those cases in which the presentence credit combined
with the actual prison terms fixed by the Adult Authority ex-
ceed the statutory maximum term applicable to the offense.
And even though, in rare cases, the discretionary role of the
Adult Authority may be curtailed, this result follows from the
policy decision already made by the Legislature when it en-
acted section 2900.5, namely, that for purposes of credit, pre-
commitment detention should be equated with postcommit-
ment imprisonment. 21
In their second argument the People contended that -the Kap-
perman holding was inconsistent with the recent decision of -the
United States Supreme Court in McGinnis v. Royster.22 In Mc-
Ginnis the Court upheld the constitutionality of a provision of a
New York statute which granted "good-time" credit toward parole
eligibility for prisoners who exhibited good behavior during their
prison confinement. The provision was challenged as violating
equal protection principles by denying similar "good-time" credit
for good behavior during presentence jail incarceration. The
Kapperman court distinguished McGinnis on the ground that the
statute in controversy in that case granted or denied credit accord-
ing to whether an inmate was incarcerated in a county jail or a
state prison, while subsection (c) of Penal Code section 2900.5
purports to base -the distinction on the date on which the inmate
entered prison.23
The People thirdly argued that retroactive application of sec-
tion 2900.5 would unnecessarily burden the administration of jus-
tice.2 4  In rejecting this argument the court first pointed out that
the Kapperman ruling requires no retrying of prisoners.25 In ad-
21. Id. at 547, 522 P.2d at 659, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 99 (emphasis by the
court).
22. 410 U.S. 263 (1973).
23. 11 Cal. 3d at 548, 522 P.2d at 660, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
24. Id. at 548, 522 P.2d at 661, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
25. In this respect the court distinguished People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518,
407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965). In Aranda the court refused retroactive
application of an amendment to Penal Code section 17 which states that certain
juvenile offenses be deemed misdemeanors. Prior to the amendment, whether, in
such a case, a juvenile was charged with a felony or a misdemeanor was left to
the discretion of the judge. Retroactive application of the amendment would have
upset countless discretionary determinations, as well as required retrials in cases
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dition, the court noted that its opinion requires that section 2900.5
must be applied to all convicted felons, not only those to whom
presentence detention occurred as a result of indigency and inabil-
ity to post bail. Because of the recent decision of In re Young,2"
prisoners have been receiving credit on their sentences only for
presentence jail custody resulting from indigency and consequent
inability to post bail. Thus the implementation of Kapperman is
facilitated by the fact that it no longer will be necessary to deter-
mine whether the person seeking credit was, in fact, indigent, or
whether he was otherwise entitled to bail. Furthermore, imple-
mentation could easily be accomplished through slight modifica-
tion of the "indigency credit" forms which were already being dis-
tributed to inmates and parolees in accordance with the Young
decision.2 7
The fourth and final argument made by the People was that
many negotiated pleas may have been entered into with presen-
tence incarceratiorn taken into consideration. The court sum-
marily dismissed this argument with the observation that pre-
sentence jail time will, in most cases, be insignificant in relation
to the statutory punishment. 28
The scope of Kapperman was limited in the companion case,
In re Grey.29 Petitioner Bernard Grey was convicted in 1967 of
one count of forgery and sentenced to a term of six months to
fourteen years, commencing on April 28, 1967.80 In 1969 the
Adult Authority fixed his term at six years, with parole granted
for three of those years beginning April 28, 1970, and terminating
April 28, 1973.81 Shortly before that termination date, on March
16, 1973, petitioner was taken into custody, again on a charge
of forgery. He was subsequently charged with violation of parole,
a parole hold was placed upon him, and his term was refixed at
the statutory maximum of fourteen years.82
where such "discretionary felons" were later tried on other charges and the court
admitted the prior felony conviction in reliance on the prior law.
26. 32 Cal. App. 3d 68, 107 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1973). In Young petitioner had
entered prison prior to the effective date of Penal Code section 2900.5. He peti-
tioned for credit on his sentence for the 62 days he had spent in jail prior to
sentencing. Petitioner's presentence incarceration was due solely to his inability
to post bail. The court of appeal held that to the extent that it is applied to an
indigent defendant confined prior to trial due to an inability to afford bail, Penal
Code section 2900, providing that a prison term commences to run upon actual
delivery of a defendant into the custody of the Department of Corrections, vio-
lates equal protection. As a result of Young, prisoners who entered prison prior
to the effective date of Penal Code section 2900.5 received presentence jail credit
only upon a showing of indigency.
27. Id. at 549 & n.9, 522 P.2d 677, 661 & n.9, 114 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 & n.9.
28. 11 Cal. 3d at 550, 522 P.2d at 662, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
29. 11 Cal. 3d 554, 522 P.2d 664, 114 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1974).





This fourteen year maximum already has been reduced
(under the Kapperman ruling) by reason of petitioner's credit for
time spent in custody while appealing his conviction. Grey main-
tained in his habeas corpus petition to the California Supreme
Court that this credit should have been applied retroactively to
advance his April 28, 1973, parole termination date. Under pe-
titioner's theory his parole must be deemed to have terminated
before the March, 1973, forgery charge was brought, rendering
the subsequent parole hold and resentencing improper."
While the court confirmed that, under the rationale of
Kapperman, petitioner was entitled to credit for his presentence
jail custody, it denied Grey's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 4
The reasoning in Grey merely reiterates the holding in Kapper-
man that Penal Code section 2900.5 will operate only to modify
the upper and lower limits of a prisoner's sentence, and has no
application to the Adult Authority's discretion in dealing with a
prisoner's term within those limits. Thus Kapperman will result
in parole termination prior to the date fixed by the Adult Au-
thority only in those cases wherein the credit for presentence time,
plus the prison and parole time already served or to be served,
would exceed the statutory maximum term.35
Justices Clark and McComb concurred in denying the writ
in Grey but, consistent with their dissent in Kapperman, dissented
from the holding that petitioner Grey was entitled to credit under
section 2900.5 for time served in the county jail pending appeal.8 6
Dissenting in Kapperman, Justice Clark suggested that, con-
trary to the majority holding, limiting a statute to prospective ap-
plication does not require a "legitimate public purpose.137  Justice
Clark's reasoning is unclear here. It is unlikely that he meant
that no legislative classification is created by subdivision (c) of
Penal Code section 2900.5. The more logical interpretation is
that even though the Legislature has created a classification, Jus-
tice Clark would hold that the traditional "legitimate state inter-
est" test should not be applied.
The dissent noted the many instances in which the United
States Supreme Court has refused to apply retroactively constitu-
tional rules of criminal procedure.38 Therefore, said Justice
33. Id.
34. Id. at 557, 522 P.2d at 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106.
35. Id. at 556, 522 P.2d at 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106.
36. Id. at 557, 522 P.2d at 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 106 (concurring and dis-
senting opinion). Gray entered prison in 1967 prior to the effective date of Penal
Code section 2900.5.
37. 11 Cal. 3d at 552, 522 P.2d at 663, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 103 (1974) (dissent-
ing opinion).
38. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) holding United States
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Clark, it was anomalous for the majority to hold that a strictly stat-
utory right must be given retroactive effect unless purely prospec-
tive application is supported by some rational and legitimate state
interest.8 9
Justice Clark's analogy to Supreme Court criminal procedure
cases is, however, imperfect. These decisions are generally dis-
tinguishable in that their retroactive application would have
burdened the courts with the herculean task of retrying countless
prisoners convicted by unconstitutional means. Avoiding the
placement of such a burden on 'the administration of justice is
clearly a legitimate public purpose, and was recognized as such
by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Payne.4"
The minority opinion in Kapperman continued with the
statement: "The vast majority of courts considering the issue have
denied retroactive effect to statutes conferring credit for time in
custody prior to commencement of sentence."' 41 In support of this
statement the dissent cited twelve cases from other jurisdictions.
An examination of these cases, however, reveals that the holding
of the Kapperman majority does not represent the drastic de-
parture from precedent that the dissenters portrayed.42
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)
nonretroactive; Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), holding Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) nonretroactive.
39. 11 Cal. 3d at 551, 522 P.2d at 662, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
40. 412 U.S. 47 (1973). The Payne Court stated the traditional three-prong
test used to determine whether newly established constitutional rights will be
given retroactive effect. The three considerations which must be weighed are (a)
the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old standard, and (c) the effect on the administra-
tion of justice of a retroactive application of the new standard.
The Kapperman dissent cited with approval the dissenting opinion in Payne,
in which Justice Marshall referred to this three-prong test as a charade and stated
that the real criterion for deciding the issue of retroactivity has been whether the
new rule either goes to jurisdiction in the traditional sense, or is so fundamental
to the guilt determining process that its observance would have resulted in acquit-
tal.
41. 11 Cal. 3d at 551, 522 P.2d at 663, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 103 (1974).
42. Out of the twelve cases cited in the dissenting opinion only two support
the minority's position. In these cases an equal protection argument was raised
and rejected by the court, the statute in question being denied retroactive effect.
Bowen v. Recorder's Court Judge, 384 Mich. 55, 179 N.W.2d 377 (1970); State v.
Montoya, 79 N.M. 353, 443 P.2d 743 (1968). Bowen cites three cases from New
Mexico which are in accord: State v. Sedillo, 79 N.M. 255, 442 P.2d 213 (1968);
State v. Thomas, 79 N.M. 346, 443 P.2d 516 (1968); State v. Dalrymple, 79 N.M.
670, 448 P.2d 182 (1968).
The holdings in three cases cited by the Kapperman dissent actually are in
opposition to the dissenter's view. In these cases statutes granting credit for pre-
sentence time were given retroactive effect. Mott v. Dail, 337 F. Supp. 731 (E.D.
N.C. 1972); People ex rel. Carroll v. Frye, 35 Ill. 2d 604, 221 N.E.2d 262 (1966);
Commonwealth v. Snyder, 427 Pa. 83, 233 A.2d 530 (1967) (language in the stat-
ute referring to "any person who has been convicted" construed to indicate legis-
lative intent that the statute be given retroactive effect).
Four cases refused retroactive application of a statute, but are distinguishable
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A more compelling argument made by the dissent is that,
assuming arguendo that to limit Penal Code section 2900.5 to
prospective application requires a legitimate public purpose, the
majority supplies such a purpose.43 The majority opinion initially
held that Kapperman is not controlled by cases refusing to apply
retroactively new statutes which lessen the punishment for a par-
ticular offense. "The Legislature," said the court, "properly may
specify that such statutes are prospective only, to assure that penal
laws will maintain their desired deterrent effect by carrying out
the original prescribed punishment as written."44  According to
the dissent this same deterrent rationale justifies preservation of
the originally determined parole eligibility date in the case of an
inmate entering prison before the effective date of section
2900.5:
Eligibility for parole consideration is as integral to punish-
ment by imprisonment as length of sentence. For a life pris-
oner like petitioner, the date he becomes eligible for parole is
of paramount importance. [Citation omitted.] Therefore,
subdivision (c) of section 2900.5 should be upheld to main-
tain the deterrent effect of punishment imposed on persons
delivered to prison prior to the effective date of the statute. 45
in that the decisions were not based on a holding that purely prospective applica-
tion of the statute is not a violation of equal protection. United States v. Pruitt,
397 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1969); State v. Williams, 262 La. 769, 264 So. 2d 638
(1972); State v. Virgil, 276 N.C. 217, 172 S.E.2d 28 (1970).
Two cases cited by the Kapperman dissent are distinguishable in that peti-
tioner was not arguing for retroactive application of a statute on an equal protec-
tion ground. Duke v. Blackwell, 429 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1970); Shank v. State,
289 N.E.2d 315 (1972).
One case is distinguishable in that the appellate court did not even decide
on the merits the issue of presentence jail credit. The court held that this was
a matter for the trial court, and not properly raised by a declaratory judgment
action. The court did refuse to apply retroactively a statute granting credit for
time spent in jail while awaiting appeal. But, although an equal protection argu-
ment was made and rejected, it concerned a legislative classification between de-
fendants who could or could not post bail, not between prisoners entering custody
before or after a certain date. Sobell v. Attorney Gen., 400 F.2d 986 (3d Cir.
1968).
43. 11 Cal. 3d at 552, 522 P.2d at 663, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 103 (1974).
44. 11 Cal. 3d at 546, 522 P.2d at 659, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 99 (1974). See
In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740, 408 P.2d 984, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1965) (dissenting
opinion). In Estrada dissenting Justice Burke (the author of the majority opinion
in Kapperman) explained the rationale for this deterrent effect. In concluding
that the prescribed punishment in effect at the time of the commission of the of-
fense is the punishment which should be imposed, Justice Burke stated:
The certainty of punishment has always been considered one of the
strongest deterrents to crime. . . . By changing the rules to make pun-
ishment uncertain the risk assumed by those contemplating committing
a crime is substantially reduced. . . . Thus those contemplating and
subsequently committing crime have all to gain and nothing to lose by
seeking every avenue of delay through appeals and legal maneuvers of
all kinds, for, who knows, the Legislature might in the meantime reduce
the punishment.
Id. at 753, 408 P.2d at 956, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
45. Id. at 552, 522 P.2d at 663, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
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Although the majority opinion does not confront this argu-
ment, the court can hardly be said to have overlooked it. Justice
Burke, who authored the majority opinion in Kapperman, also
wrote the dissenting opinion in In re Estrada," where he articu-
lated the deterrent rationale referred to by the dissent.47
A comparison of these two opinions by Justice Burke sug-
gests that, for deterrent purposes, there is a distinction between
gratuitously reducing a prisoner's sentence and advancing a pris-
oner's parole eligibility date by counting all of his days of incar-
ceration, whether spent in a county jail or a state prison, and re-
gardless of the date he entered prison.
As a direct result of the Kapperman ruling the Adult Author-
ity must inform all persons under its custody of the availability
of presentence credit, and adjust its records in accordance with
the majority opinion." The implications of the opinion, however,
extend far beyond this immediate result. Kapperman lays open
the possibility of an equal protection attack on all classifications
created by limiting a statute to prospective operation. A future
bar to retroactivity of a statute must be justified by a showing that
,this limitation is reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose.
Bruce C. Janke
INSURANCE CONTRACTS-MEDICAL INSURER FOUND
IN BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING BY FAILURE TO MAKE PAY-
MENTS DURING PENDENCY OF INSURED'S CLAIM FOR
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS AND WAS LIA-
BLE FOR PHYSICAL AND MENTAL DISTRESS PROXI-
MATELY CAUSED THEREBY-Silberg v. California Life In-
suance Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, modified, 11 Cal. 3d 678a, 521 P.2d
1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
In March, 1966, Enrique Silberg was issued a medical insur-
ance policy by the California Life Insurance Company which pro-
vided that the insurance carrier would pay the cost of hospital
care, including surgeon's fees up to $5,000, with $100 deductible.
The policy also contained an exclusion clause stating that it did
46. 63 Cal. 2d 740, 408 P.2d 984, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1965).
47. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
48. 11 Cal. 3d at 550, 522 P.2d at 662, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 102 (1974).
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not cover any loss caused by injury for which compensation was
payable under any workmen's compensation law.'
A,t the time the policy was issued and when the injury oc-
curred, plaintiff Silberg owned and operated a dry cleaning busi-
ness. The premises of the dry cleaning operation was adjacent
to a laundromat owned by the plaintiffs landlord. Under an
agreement with the landlord, tho plaintiff performed incidental
maintenance services in connection with the laundromat business.2
On July 16, 1966, Silberg noticed smoke in the laundromat
area and climbed onto an operating washing machine to investi-
gate the source. The glass in the lid of the machine broke, and
the plaintiffs right foot was severed at the ankle. Silberg under-
went surgery for the restoration of his foot at a nearby hospital
and notified the defendant carrier of his operation and subse-
quent hospitalization. 3 Upon learning that Silberg had applied for
workmen's compensation benefits, California Life refused to
make any payments under the policy, notwithstanding the fact that
the workmen's compensation carrier was denying liability on -the
ground that the plaintiff was not an employee at the time of the
injury.4 California Life maintained, throughout the plaintiffs
ordeal, 5 that it was entitled to wait until the conclusion of the
workmen's compensation proceeding before it either paid or
denied the claim.6
The final resolution of the workmen's compensation question
took nearly two years. On April 30, 1968, the Workmen's Com-
pensation Appeals Board approved a compromise and release,
settling the case for $3,700. Defendant carrier then denied liabil-
ity under the insurance policy on the ground that the $3,700 work-
men's compensation settlement rendered the exclusion clause ap-
plicable.7
Silberg initiated suit, alleging two causes of action. The first
count sought a declaration that the defendant was liable under the
policy, and the second sought damages for physical and mental
distress alleging that the defendant was guilty of (1) bad faith,
and (2) malicious and oppressive conduct.
The trial court, sitting without a jury, determined in the
declaratory relief count that the insurance policy was ambiguous
1. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 456, 521 P.2d 1103,
1105, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 713 (1974).
2. Id. at 457, 521 P.2d at 1106, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 458, 521 P.2d at 1107, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
5. See text accompanying notes 27-28 infra.
6. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 458, 521 P.2d 1103,
1107, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 715 (1974).
7. Id. at 456, 521 P.2d at 1105, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
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and awarded the plaintiff $4,900 under the policy (the policy limits
minus the $100 deductible). On the second cause of action, a
jury found for the plaintiff and awarded $75,00'0 in compensatory
damages and $500,000 in punitive damages.8  The trial judge
thereupon granted the defendant's motion for a new trial on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that
the defendant was guilty of bad faith justifying an award of com-
pensatory damages, or of fraud or oppression justifying an award
of exemplary damages.9 The plaintiff appealed from the order
granting a new trial and the defendant cross-appealed from the
judgment.
The California Supreme Court, per Justice Mosk, held that,
,as a matter of law, the defendant's failure to make payments dur-
ing the pendency of the plaintiffs claim for workmen's compensa-
tion benefits constituted a breach of the insurance contract's im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for which compen-
satory damages were justified. 10 However, the supreme court
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that
the evidence was insufficient to support an award of exemplary
damages."
The court's ruling in Silberg is a logical extension of the prin-
ciple, rooted in the two landmark decisions of Communale v.
Trader's & General Insurance Co." and Crisci v. Security Insur-
ance Co., 3 that every insurance contract contains an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing requiring that neither party
will do anything to injure the right of the other to receive the
benefits of the agreement.' 4
Both Communale and Crisci involved situations where liabil-
ity insurers had failed to settle third party claims against their in-
sureds, thereby exposing the insured to a judgment in excess of
the policy limits. The court in Communale interpreted the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to mean that an
insurer has a duty to settle a claim in an appropriate case, and
that in exercising that duty it is obligated to give the interests of
the insured at least as much consideration as it gives its own
interests. Any unwarranted refusal of reasonable settlement
8. Id. at 456, 521 P.2d at 1106, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 460, 521 P.2d at 1108, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
11. Id. at 457, 521 P.2d at 1106, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
12. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
13. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
14. Communale v. Trader's & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d
198, 200 (1958); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173,
176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967).
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would constitute a breach of the implied covenant. 15
In Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. the breach of this duty
-to accept reasonable settlements was held to sound in tort as well
as in contract, thereby allowing an insured to recover for all detri-
ment resulting from such breach, including mental distress. 6
Communale and Crisci involved actions against insurers for
failure to settle third party claims; neither case was concerned
with punitive damages. In Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Com-
pany,17 the supreme court first recognized that the duty of good
faith and fair dealing encompassed not only the good faith duty
to settle third party claims, but also the obligation of an insurer
to handle fairly and in good faith the claims of its insured."8
Moreover, Gruenberg established the principle that, in an appro-
priate case, an insurer might be held liable for damages as well
as compensatory damages.
Most of the pre-Silberg decisions involved conduct on the
part of the defendant insurance company of a patently outrageous
nature.' 9 In fact, most involved elements of fraud or malice,
15. Communale v. Trader's Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 328 P.2d 198,
201 (1958).
16. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19 (1967).
17. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
18. As the court in Gruenberg stated:
It is manifest that a common legal principle underlies all of the
foregoing decisions; namely, that in every insurance contract there is an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The duty to so act is
imminent in the contract whether the company is attending to the claims
of third persons against the insured or the claims of the insured itself.
Accordingly, when the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withholds
payment of the claim of its insured, it is subject to liability in tort.
Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
Two California appellate decisions had earlier extended the Communale-
Crisci principle to cases in which the insurance carrier unreasonably and in bad
faith withholds payment of the insured's own claim. Richardson v. Employers
Liab. Assurance Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 239, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547, 552 (1972)
(disapproved on another ground in Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566,
580 n.10, 510 P.2d 1032, 1042 n.10, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 490 n.10); Fletcher v.
Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93
(1970).
19. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1973) (Defendant insurance company encouraged criminal charges to
be brought against the insured by falsely implying that plaintiff had a motive to
commit arson and then used plaintiff's failure to appear at an examination during
the pendency of the criminal charges as a pretense for denying liability.); Crisci
v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967) (De-
spite a warning from its attorney that a jury might return a verdict greatly in
excess of the policy limits, the insurer refused to accept the claimant's offer to
settle well within the policy limits. At trial, the jury awarded $101,000. The
insurance company paid the $10,000 policy limit, but left the insured to settle the
excess portion of the judgment. As a result of the settlement, the insured suffered
financial and mental ruin.); Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 25
Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972) (Defendant automobile insurer de-
liberately withheld payments of its insureds' claim under the uninsured motorist
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lending confusion to what exactly constituted "bad faith." Sil-
berg, however, did not involve any such blatantly unjust conduct.
California Life Insurance Company was, for the most part, pro-
ceeding upon the ostensibly genuine belief that the policy as writ-
ten afforded no coverage.2" Although undoubtedly grounded in
economic motivies, its decision did not rest on malice or fraud,
but rather on a business judgment that no coverage existed.
Thus, after Silberg, there should be no doubt that the implied-
in-law duty of good faith and fair dealing can be breached even
in the absence of any actual fraud, malice, or oppression. "Bad
faith" in Silberg consisted simply in California Life's failure to
give the same consideration to the insured's interests as it gave
to its own financial interest.
Even though the earlier cases have involved unquestionably
outrageous conduct, the California Supreme Court has repeatedly
implied that no such severity would necessarily be required in
order to breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.2 Al-
though referring to third party claims, the court stated in Com-
munale:
An insurer who denies coverage does so at its own risk, and,
although its position may not have been entirely groundless,
coverage months after it knew the claim to be completely valid; it forced an arbi-
tration hearing on the claim against which it already knew that it had no defense;
even after the award was made, it instructed its local office to attempt "to make
the best possible settlement," and forced the insureds to resort to litigation to have
the award judicially confirmed.); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.
App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) (Defendant insurance company attempted
to minimize its liability under the policy by falsely accusing the plaintiff of mate-
rial misrepresentation in filling out his application and by falsely claiming that
he should be paid under the sickness provisions of the policy which only allowed
payment for a maximum of two years; the insurer also sent false and threatening
communications to plaintiff in its effort to get the plaintiff to surrender his policy
or to disadvantageously settle a nonexistent suit.).
20. What Professor Keeton once pointed out in regard to bad faith in third
party claims held true for the insured's own claim in Silberg:
[B]ad faith can be established by proof that the defendant engaged in
a course of conduct involving a deliberate preference of the company's
interests over the insured's irrespective of whether the company's repre-
sentatives honestly believed that such a course of conduct was within
their legal rights.
Keeton, Ancillary Rights of the Insured Against His Liability Insurer, 13 VAND.
L. REv. 837, 842 (1960).
21. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 426 P.2d 173,
176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967) where the court said:
Several cases, in considering the liability of the insurer, contain lan-
guage to the effect that bad faith is the equivalent of dishonesty, fraud,
and concealment (citations omitted). Obviously a showing that the in-
surer has been guilty of actual dishonesty, fraud, or concealment is rele-
vant to the determination whether it has given consideration to the in-
sured's interest in considering a settlement offer within the policy limits.
The language used in the cases, however, should not be understood as
meaning that in the absence of evidence establishing actual dishonesty,
fraud, or concealment no recovery may be had for a judgment in excess
of the policy limits.
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if the denial is found to be wrongful it is liable for the full
amount which will compensate the insured for all the detri-
ment caused by the insurer's breach of the express and im-
plied obligations of the contract. 22
By finding bad faith in the Silberg context, the California
Supreme Court has again reckoned with the true economic, so-
cial, and legal realities attending the insurer-insured relation-
ship.23 It is a "special relationship" that flows from the nature
of the insurance industry's public trust and the adhesion character
of its contracts. 24  The position of power held by any insurance
company, because of its ability vitally to affect the interests of an-
other, brings with it a stringent obligation to deal fairly and in
good faith in discharging its responsibilities to the insured. Also
underlying this relationship is the "doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tions" outlined by the court in Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.:2
In dealing with standardized contracts courts have to deter-
mine what the weaker contracting party could legitimately
expect by way of services according to the enterpriser's
"calling", and to what extent the stronger party disappointed
reasonable expectations based on the typical life situation.26
As stated by Justice Tobriner in Barrera v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., "the reasonable expectation of
both the public and the insured is that the insurer will duly per-
22. 50 Cal. 2d at 660, 328 P.2d at 202 (emphasis added).
23. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 403,
89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (1970) where in a general discussion of this "special relation-
ship" between the insurer and the insured, the appellate court said:
The insurance business is governmentally regulated to a substantial de-
gree. It is affected with a public interest and offers services of a quasi-
public nature. [citations omitted] An insurer has a special relationship
to its insured and has special implied-in-law duties toward the insured.
[citations omitted] To some extent this special relationship and these
special duties take cognizance of the great disparity in the economic sit-
uations and bargaining abilities of the insurer and the insured. [citations
omitted] To some extent the special relationship and duties of the in-
surer exist in recognition of the fact that the insured does not contract
"... to obtain a commercial advantage but to protect [himself] against
the risks of accidental losses, including the mental distress which might
follow from the losses. Among the considerations in purchasing . . .
insurance, as insurers are well aware, is the peace of mind and security
it will provide in the event of an accidental loss .... ." (Crisci v. Secu-
rity Ins. Co., supra, 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19, 426 P.2d
173, 180.) These considerations are particularly cogent in disability in-
surance. The very risks insured against presuppose that if and when a
claim is made, the insured will be disabled and in strait financial circum-
stances and, therefore, particularly vulnerable to oppressive tactics on the
part of an economically powerful entity.
24. See Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 668 n.5,
456 P.2d 674, 680-81 n.5, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112-13 n.5 (1969).
25. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
26. Id. at 270, 419 P.2d at 172, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 108, quoting Kessler, Con-
tracts of Adhesion, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 637 (1943).
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form its basic commitment: to provide insurance; '27 such was Mr.
Silberg's expectation. The insurance company's policy applica-
tion had promised in bold-face type: "Protect Yourself Against
the Medical Bills That Can 'Ruin You." Yet what Silberg suffered
in the three years following the accident might have been lifted
from the Theatre of the Absurd.
After the initial operation on Silberg's foot, infection devel-
oped, requiring him to undergo surgery and hospitalization on
three more occasions. He was, however, compelled to go from
hospital to hospital as unpaid medical bills precluded him from
entering two of the hospitals a second time. To obtain the neces-
sary fourth operation, Silberg had to contrive to enter the hospital
on a weekend, so that hospital administrators could not check his
coverage with the defendant until after the operation had already
been performed. In addition, Silberg had to borrow $2,000 to
cover business expenses, yet ultimately lost his business. Unable
to pay his rent, he was forced to change residences five times.
He had difficulty affording needed medication, and his wheelchair
was repossessed! Finally, he suffered two nervous breakdowns.2"
Throughout this entire period, the insurance company was
aware of the substantial medical bills incurred by the plaintiff, but
insisted that there could be no final determination as to its liability
under the policy until the conclusion of the workmen's compensa-
tion proceeding. 29
The evidence was conflicting as to the prevailing practice in
the insurance industry regarding the payment of claims under
these circumstances.30  Nevertheless, the court found the course
of conduct followed by the defendant insurance company in Sil-
berg violative as a matter of law of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing implied in every insurance contract. Even if the in-
surance carrier genuinely believed that no coverage existed, its
responsibility to the insured obligated it ,to consider the insured's
interests as much as its own.3' According to the court, it was
unreasonable for the company to have withheld the medical pay-
ments when it could simply have paid the hospital charges and
then asserted a lien on the workmen's compensation award to re-
cover these payments. 2 As the Silberg court stated:
27. 71 Cal. 2d at 669, 456 P.2d at 682, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 114.
28. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 459, 521 P.2d 1103,
1108, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 716 (1974).
29. Id. at 461, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
30. Id. at 459, 521 P.2d at 1108, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
31. Id. at 460, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
32. There were other alternatives open to the insurance company as well. In
a footnote, the Silberg court suggests that at least one other course could probably
have been adopted by the insurance company consistent with its duty under the
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No explanation was advanced by defendant as to why it
failed to adopt this course in order to vindicate the promise
made in the application that the policy was intended to pro-
tect the insured against medical bills which could result in
financial ruin. Defendant's attitude toward -the payment of
plaintiff's claim was expressed in the declaratory relief phase
of the case: merely that it was entitled to wait until the pend-
ing compensation proceeding was concluded before it paid or
denied the claim. The company failed to see a conflict with
its express promise to protect against ruinous medical bills.
3 3
In the wake of the plaintiff's physical and financial ruin, such cal-
lousness hardly seems consonant with what is essentially the in-
surer's fiduciary duty to its insured. 4
While the supreme court in Silberg further clarified the scope
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts,
it left another issue largely unresolved-the question of the evi-
dentiary basis for an award of exemplary damages. For the last
fifteen years, a controversy has existed in California as to what
constitutes the requisite elements for an award of punitive dam-
ages under section 3294 of the Civil Code.3 5  That section states
in pertinent part:
[W]here the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud,
or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the
actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of ex-
ample and by way of punishing the defendant.3 6
At least one court has taken the position that to prove malice un-
der section 3294, the plaintiff must show hatred and ill will or
"the desire to do harm for the mere satisfaction of doing it."
3 7
This was the standard expounded in Canady v. Superior Court,
whiclh the California Supreme Court has recently ordered un-
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing:
Another alternative customarily utilized, according to plaintiff's wit-
ness, was for the insurer on the hospital benefit policy to attempt to
reach an informal agreement for reimbursement with the workmen's
compensation carrier.
Id. at 460 n.2, 521 P.2d at 1108 n.2, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 716 n.2.
33. Id. at 461, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
34. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 582, 510 P.2d 1032, 1043,
108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 491 (1973) (Roth, J., dissenting); citing 7A APPLEMAN, IN-
SURANCE LAW AND PRACrICE § 4711, at 553:
As the champion of the insured, [the insurer] must consider as para-
mount his interests, rather than its own, and may not gamble with his
funds. Its relationship is somewhat of a fiduciary one ....
35. See Goodman & Seaton, Foreward: Ripe for Decision, Internal Workings
and Current Concerns of the California Supreme Court, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 309,
347 (1974). The commentators suggest that the preferable construction would
be a broad reading of the statute.
36. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970).




published. 8  Other courts have read the section differently, al-
lowing an inference of actual malice to be drawn where the de-
fendant's actions were taken recklessly and without regard to their
injurious consequences.3 9 As stated in Toole v. Richardson-Mer-
rell Inc.,40 "such malice is consistent with a personal intent to
injure those affected by the defendant's conduct."41
With respect to the punitive damages issue in Silberg, the
California Supreme Court merely concluded that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in holding that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to support an award of punitive damages. It therefore
affirmed the trial court's order granting a new trial on that issue.
But, by only holding that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion, and by not deciding whether the requisite malicious or op-
pressive conduct existed in this case to support an award of puni-
tive damages, the court failed to grasp the opportunity to resolve
any ambiguity surrounding section 3294.
The court did state that the defendant must "act with the
intent to vex, injure or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of
plaintiff's rights",42 citing Wolisen v. Hathaway43 and Roth v. Shell
Oil Company.44  However, any clue that could perhaps be
gleaned from those cases as to the requisite standard for estab-
lishing malice vanishes in light of -the fact that each was cited as
authority for both the Canady and Toole approaches to the malice
controversy.
The importance of Silberg lies in the finding of bad faith and
unfair dealing on the part of the defendant insurance company,
rendering it liable for compensatory damages. In taking the posi-
tion that it was entitled to wait until the conclusion of the work-
men's compensation proceeding before either paying or rejecting
the claim, despite its knowledge of the plaintiff's situation, the in-
surer was found, as a matter of law, to have breached its implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Even if coverage were
genuinely debatable, California Life could simply have made the
38. 34 Cal. App. 3d 467 (1973) (ordered unpublished). The Reporter of De-
cisions is directed not to publish this opinion in the Official Appellate Reports
pursuant to an order of the California Supreme Court on December 14, 1973. See
CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 14; CAL. R. Cr. 926 (West 1974).
39. See, e.g., Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 306 (1968); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60
Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Sturges v. Charles L. Harney, Inc., 165 Cal. App. 2d 306,
331 P.2d 1072 (1958).
40. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
41. Id. at 714, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
42. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 462, 521 P.2d 1103,
1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 718 (1974).
43. 32 Cal. 2d 632, 198 P.2d 1 (1948).
44. 185 Cal. App. 2d 676, 8 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1960).
240 [Vol. 15
INSURANCE CONTRACTS
payments under the policy and then asserted a lien in the work-
men's compensation proceeding to recover any payments it had
made.
In adopting a "wait and see" attitude toward the payment
of its insured's claim, California Life failed to recognize the spe-
cial duty owed its insured. It failed to consider the insured's in-
terests as much as it considered its own. As a quasi-public en-
tity,45 an insurance company is under a duty to conduct itself in
the highest degree of good faith. The result reached in Silberg
illustrates just how extensive this good faith duty is.
M. Elaine Mielke
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-EXCLUSION-
ARY RULE APPLIES TO EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM
SEARCH CONDUCTED BY HOUSING AUTHORITY SECU-
RITY GUARD-Dyas v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 628, 522
P.2d 674, 114 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1974).
Marvin E. Klepper was employed as a uniformed patrol-
man by the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles. At
9:30 p.m. on May 1, 1973, Klepper was delivering legal papers
to a public housing project when he noticed the petitioner, Alvin
Lee Dyas, standing on a nearby street corner. Petitioner was
talking with two other men and holding a wax paper bag in his
hand. Petitioner put the bag in his pocket. A few minutes later,
Klepper emerged from the housing project and again observed
petitioner holding the same bag. When Dyas hurriedly put the
bag in his pocket a second time, Klepper suspected that it con-
tained narcotics and radioed for a back-up unit of the housing au-
thority security force. The guard then ordered petitioner and his
companions to stand facing a nearby wall and to place their hands
against the wall. As Klepper began a pat-down search of peti-
tioner's jacket, a brief scuffle occurred. Klepper drew his re-
volver and pushed petitioner back toward the wall. Petitioner
reached up and dropped the wax paper bag over the wall.
Klepper left petitioner in the custody of a fellow security guard
and retrieved the bag, which contained amphetamine pills.
Klepper placed petitioner under arrest, handcuffed him, took him
45. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 403,
89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (1970).
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to the security force patrol car, and delivered him into the custody
of the Los Angeles Police Department, along with the bag of am-
phetamines.
Petitioner was charged by an information in Los Angeles
County Superior Court with one count of possession of ampheta-
mines for sale.' Petitioner moved to suppress the narcotics, argu-
ing that they were the fruits of an illegal search and seizure.2 The
motion was denied and petitioner sought review by statutory writ
of mandate' before the California Court of Appeal for the Second
District. That court denied Dyas' petition for a peremptory writ
of mandate,4 and he appealed to the California Supreme Court.
The prosecution conceded that Klepper had not obtained an
arrest or search warrant prior to the pat-down search of petitioner
and that the search lacked the requisite probable cause.' The
central issue before the court was whether the evidence secured
as a result of the guard's actions should be subject to the exclu-
sionary rule. The prosecution maintained that Klepper had
undertaken the search and arrest of Dyas as a private citizen and
1. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11351 (1970), as amended, § 11351(1973) (West Supp. 1974).
2. The motion was made pursuant to CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5(a) (West
1972) which provides in part:
A defendant may move for the return of property or to suppress as evi-dence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a search
or seizure on the ground that: (1) The search or seizure without a war-
rant was unreasonable.
The pat-down of petitioner's jacket was not technically a full-blown "search."
Nonetheless, the "seizure" of his person short of formal arrest and the exploration
of the outer surfaces of his clothing fall within the purview of the fourth amend-
ment and must meet the standards set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29-
30 (1968). Under Terry, an officer, even though he lacks probable cause to ar-
rest an individual for a crime, may make a reasonable search for weapons for
his own and others' protection where he has reason to believe that he is dealing
with an armed and dangerous individual. However, it appears that Klepper's pat-
down search of Dyas' jacket did not fall within the Terry standard. Klepper
acknowledged at the preliminary examination that his suspicions as to the contents
of the wax paper bag motivated his stop and frisk of petitioner. He noted that
such bags are normally used to carry marijuana. In addition, the guard did not
produce any facts which would have supported a reasonable suspicion that Dyas
was armed. Dyas v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 628, 631, 522 P.2d 674, 676,
114 Cal. Rptr. 114, 116 (1974). On its face, holding a wax paper bag does not
comprise criminal activity; nor does putting the bag in one's pocket. An arrest
and search based on events as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal
activity are unlawful. See Remers v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 659, 470 P.2d
11, 87 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1970); Cunha v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 352, 357, 466
P.2d 704, 706-07, 85 Cal. Rptr. 160, 162-63 (1970).
3. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5(i) (West Supp. 1974).
4. Dyas v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 628, 631, 522 P.2d 674, 676, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 114, 116,(1974).
5. See note 2 supra. At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evi-
dence, the superior court ruled that had Klepper and his partner "been acting as
peace officers," the search of Dyas would have been "clearly unreasonable." Dyas
v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d at 631, 522 P.2d at 676, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 116.
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for a private purpose.6 Petitioner argued that security patrolmen
employed by the Los Angeles Housing Authority functioned as
law enforcement officers "engaged in ferreting out crime for the
benefit of the state."7 Unless the state could show that Klepper's
actions were truly "private,"" the contested pat-down would qual-
ify as an unreasonable governmental search subject to the exclu-
sionary rule.9
In Dyas v. Superior Court, the court held that as a matter
of law the search of petitioner was conducted neither by a private
citizen nor for a private purpose. 10 Therefore, the narcotics ob-
tained by that search were inadmissible as evidence against peti-
tioner.
The California Supreme Court has consistently refused to
apply the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained by private citi-
zens. 1 Until 1955, evidence illegally obtained by police officers
6. At the preliminary examination, Klepper testified that he had made the
arrest "as a private citizen." 11 Cal. 3d at 631, 522 P.2d at 676, 114 Cal. Rptr.
at 116. CAL. PEN. CODE § 834 (West 1970) provides: "[Ain arrest may be
made by a peace officer or by a private person." Id. § 837(1), further provides
that a private person may arrest another "[flor a public offense committed or at-
tempted in his presence."
7. Brief for Petitioner at 1, Dyas v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 628, 522
P.2d 674, 114 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1974).
8. When the question of the legality of an arrest or of a search and seizure
is raised either at the preliminary hearing or at the trial, the defendant makes
a prima facie case when he establishes that an arrest was made without a warrant
or that a search was made without a warrant; the burden then rests upon the pros-
ecution to show proper justification. Dyas v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 628, 635-
36, 522 P.2d 674, 679, 114 Cal. Rptr. 114, 119 (1974); Badillo v. Superior Court,
46 Cal. 2d 269, 272, 294 P.2d 23, 25 (1956).
9. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the United States Supreme Court
held that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the United
States Constitution was inadmissible in a state court. Six years earlier, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 438, 445, 282 P.2d
905, 907, 911 (1955), had ruled that evidence obtained in violation of CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 19, as well as the fourth amendment as applied to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, was inadmissible.
10. 11 Cal. 3d 628, 631-32, 522 P.2d 674, 676-77, 114 Cal. Rptr. 114, 116-
17 (1974).
11. The California courts have uniformly followed Burdeau v. McDowell, 256
U.S. 465 (1921), wherein the United States Supreme Court held:
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches
and seizures, and . . . its protection applies to governmental action. Its
origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon
sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other
than governmental agencies ...
Id. at 475.
See, e.g., People v. Buchanan, 26 Cal. App. 3d 274, 286-87, 103 Cal. Rptr.
66, 75 (1972); People v. Houle, 13 Cal. App. 3d 892, 895-96, 91 Cal. Rptr. 874,
875-76 (1970); People v. Baker, 12 Cal. App. 3d 826, 833-34, 96 Cal. Rptr. 760,
765 (1970); People v. Cheatham, 263 Cal. App. 2d 458, 461-62, 69 Cal. Rptr.
679, 681-82 (1968). California courts, however, have held the fourth amendment
applicable to a private person acting as an agent of law enforcement officers, or
willfully participating in joint activity with such officers, who either request the
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was also admissible in state proceedings. 2 In People v. Cahan,'8
the court adopted the exclusionary rule as a means of enforcing
constitutional guarantees of privacy vis-A-vis unreasonable gover-
ment intrusions. 4
In Cahan, police officers had obtained evidence by means
of illegally installed microphones, which recorded conversations
between the defendant and other members of an alleged book-
making conspiracy. The recordings were held to be inadmissible
as evidence, in light of the overriding policy considerations of (1)
deterring law enforcement officers from engaging in unconstitu-
tional activities15 and (2) curtailing judicial involvement in the
"dirty business"' 6 of illegal search and seizure. The Dyas court
seized upon the former policy consideration in weighing the
inadmissibility of the amphetamines.
The court noted that the distinction between a "private"
search and a "government" or "state" search was directly related
to -the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule as outlined in
People v. Botts.17 Under the Botts rationale, the typical local po-
lice force-well-trained, disciplined, experienced-would be sus-
ceptible to various pressures from conviction-minded prosecutors
and departmental higher-ups. Since criminal convictions would
be jeopardized by failure to heed constitutional restraints, the
court reasoned, courts could be fairly certain that officers would
know of such restraints and comply with them.'8
A private citizen, on the other hand, would be far less likely
to feel the restrictive grip of the exclusionary rule precisely be-
cause he would not be part of any official law enforcement struc-
ture. As a result, the judicial system would have little or no as-
surance that the suppression of privately obtained evidence would
operate as an effective sanction among members of the general
illegal search or have knowledge of it but fail to protect the third party's rights.People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 911-12, 500 P.2d 1097, 1105-06, 103 Cal.Rptr. 897, 905-06 (1972); Stapleton v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 100, 102-
03, 447 P.2d 967, 969-70, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575, 577-78 (1969); People v. Fierro,236 Cal. App. 2d 344, 347, 46 Cal. Rptr. 132-34 (1965). More specifically, theCalifornia Supreme Court has held the exclusionary rule applicable to evidenceillegally obtained by such persons. Stapleton v. Superior Court supra at 103.
12. WITKJN, California Evidence, §§ 49-50, at 51-54 (2d ed. 1966).
13. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
14. Id. at 439-51, 282 P.2d at 908-14.
15. Id. at 444-45, 282 P.2d at 911. The court was persuaded that existing
citizens' remedies, such as civil actions, administrative sanctions, and criminalprosecutions, had proved ineffective in curbing police abuses of fourth amendment
provisions.
16. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting), cited in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d at 445, 282 P.2d at 912.
17. 250 Cal. App. 2d 478, 58 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1967).
18. Id. at 482-83, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 415-16.
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public. Thus, whether an individual had undertaken a search for
evidence as an ordinary citizen or as an arm of the state would
depend not only upon his relationship to the government, but also
upon his ties with an organization that, on its face, would be
responsive to the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule.
The prosecution asserted that a public housing authority
patrolman is not a law enforcement officer since he is not listed
in the Penal Code under any of the categories of "peace offi-
cers."'19 In a footnote, the court observed that such classifications,
fashioned by the legislature, had no bearing on the applicability
of the judge-made exclusionary rule; they merely authorized those
persons therein designated "to exercise the statutory powers of a
peace officer."20
The court instead focused on the circumstances surrounding
the search of petitioner and concluded that Klepper was clearly
"acting under color of authority."'" He was attired in "standard
police dress" complete with revolver and handcuffs. He drove
a marked patrol vehicle which was outfitted with a two-way radio.
In the encounter with petitioner, the guard was quick to use his
"indicia of authority in the manner in which they were in-
tended."'2 2  Klepper's acts, in the court's opinion, were those of
a specially trained and equipped law enforcement officer, not
those of an ordinary private citizen.
The People argued that Klepper was not acting to enforce
state laws but to protect the interests of a private employer. At
the time of the stop and search, the People contended, the patrol-
man's role was much more akin to that of a store detective protect-
ing persons and property on his employer's premises than that of
a police officer.23  The court was not receptive to this argument
and undertook to expose its inherent weaknesses. Moreover, it
seized the opportunity to overturn an 'appellate court decision,
People v. Wright,24 which supported the State's positions.
25
19. CAL. PEN. CODE § 830.1-830.11 (West Supp. 1974).
20. 11 Cal. 3d at 635-36 n.3, 522 P.2d at 679 n.3, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 119 n.3.
21. Id. at 633, 522 P.2d at 678, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
22. Id. As the facts showed, Klepper utilized his radio, revolver, handcuffs,
and patrol car in the stop, search, and arrest of petitioner; it can also be presumed
that Klepper's uniformed appearance played a substantial role in securing peti-
tioner's compliance with the order to place his hands on the wall.
23. See People v. Payne, 1 Cal. App. 3d 361, 365, 81 Cal. Rptr. 635, 638
(1969); People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1963). But
see People v. Millard, 15 Cal. App. 3d 759, 93 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1971) (fourth
amendment is applicable to a search by an off-duty policeman employed as a store
detective).
24. 249 Cal. App. 2d 692, 57 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1967).
25. 11 Cal. 3d at 634-35, 522 P.2d at 678-79, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 118-19.
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As an employee of the Los Angeles Housing Authority,
Klepper was a creature of all three levels of government: federal,
state, and local. While technically on the payroll of the City of
Los Angeles, he was bonded, funded, and controlled by theUnited States Housing Authority.2" In addition, the Los Angeles
Housing Authority was instituted as a municipal corporation under
the California Health and Safety Code, and it "serves as an admin-
istrative agency of the state for the pursuit of state objectives."27
Klepper was unmistakably a government employee and an agent
of the state.
Relying on People v. Wright,28 the People maintained that
an individual's status as a state agent was not alone sufficient tobring his unreasonable search of another within the domain of the
exclusionary rule. The Wright court held that -the exclusionary
rule applied to the conduct of a person employed by a government
agency only if the "primary mission" of that agency was law en-
forcement. 29  The Dyas court rejected the Wright opinion as in-
consistent with United States Supreme Court decisions compelling
municipal health and fire inspectors3 ° to comply with the fourth
amendment warrant requirements. Recent state court decisions
also have held that warrantless searches by county social work-
26. Dyas v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 628, 634, 522 P.2d 674, 678, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 114, 118. The court said:
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970), the United States Housing Authorityis an entity within the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
and hence part of the federal executive branch. . . . The statute spe-
cifically declares the authority to be "an agency and instrumentality of
the United States."
27. Dyas v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 628, 634, 522 P.2d 674, 678, 114 Cal.Rptr. 114, 118. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34240 (West 1973) providesin part: "In each county and city there is a public body corporate and politic
known as the housing authority of the county or city."
The California Health and Safety Code states that a housing authority "con-
stitutes a corporate and politic public body exercising public and essential govern-
mental functions. ... Id. § 34.
The court stated in Housing Authority v. Los Angeles, 38 Cal. 2d 853, 862,243 P.2d 515, 519 (1952): "Housing authority. . . and the city are separate bod-ies politic . . . and both function as administrative arms of state in pursuing state
concerns and effecting legislative objectives."
Banks v. Housing Authority of San Francisco, 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8, 260P.2d 668, 672 (1953), held that action taken by a municipal housing authorityis state action by one of its official branches within the purview of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.
28. 249 Cal. App. 2d 692, 57 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1967).
29. Id. at 694-95, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 782. In denying Dyas' petition for a writ
of mandate, the court of appeal based its decision on Wright and stated that theprimary purpose of the Housing Authority under state law (CAL. HEALTH &SAFETY CODE §§ 34201, 34501) was to clear slums and establish low-income
housing.
30. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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ers,31 state agricultural inspectors 2 and United States postal work-
ers33 are subject to the exclusionary rule.
The proper test for determining the admissibility of evidence
produced by a government employee's unreasonable search34 was
not the employer's primary mission as a government agency, but
rather the Botts3, standard as applied to the individual employee.
Hence, the key consideration for the Dyas court was whether the
particular state agent and "all others similarly situated' 36 would
be dissuaded by the exclusionary rule from making illegal
searches of private citizens. Factors such as "training or experi-
ence, responsibilities or duties"37 would be taken into account in
gauging the government employee's susceptibility to the rule's
deterrent effect.38
As indicated above, " Klepper was uniformed, armed and
equipped in the manner of a sophisticated law enforcement of-
ficer. His handling of petitioner manifested at least some special
training, if not considerable expertise, in the field of arrest and
search.4" From these circumstances, the court inferred that one
of the patrolman's duties was "to enforce penal statutes and regu-
lations on or about housing authority property,"'41 and that he was
in the process of discharging that duty when he made the illegal
search of Dyas.42
31. Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 623 (1967).
32. Vidaurri v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 3d 550, 91 Cal. Rptr. 704
(1970).
33. People v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. App. 2d 489, 79 Cal. Rptr. 904
(1969).
34. An unreasonable search is one which occurs either without a warrant or
the requisite probable cause.
35. People v. Botts, 250 Cal. App. 2d 478, 58 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1967).
36. 11 Cal. 3d at 635, 522 P.2d at 679, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
40. In a footnote, the court observed that Klepper, by the prosecution's own
admission at the preliminary hearing, "ha[d] been educated in the laws of search
and seizure." 11 Cal. 3d at 636 n.4, 522 P.2d at 680 n.4, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 120
n.4.
41. Id. at 636, 522 P.2d at 679, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 119. The court was re-
quired to make this inference since the State introduced no evidence of Klepper's
duties. The Los Angeles Housing Authority is empowered by section 34278(a)
of the Health and Safety Code to employ such "officers, agents, and employees
as it requires, and to determine their qualifications, duties, terms of employment
and compensation." From this the court inferred that since Klepper had been
hired by an employer agency having the power to determine his duties, he was
acting within the scope of his employment as a government agent, and not of his
own private volition, when he searched and arrested the petitioner on or near his
employer's property.
42. Id. See People v. Martin, 225 Cal. App. 2d 91, 96, 36 Cal. Rptr. 924,
927 (1964). There, three Los Angeles City policemen, who had made an illegal
drug arrest outside their zone of authority (in another city), argued that the ar-
1,9741
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In the view of the court, this type of state agent performing
this particular kind of state-related function would be just as re-
sponsive to ,the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule as the
ordinary police officer. Klepper's search of petitioner was thus
an unreasonable state search forbidden by both the California and
United States Constitutions.43 Consequently, the fruits of that
search were inadmissible as evidence.
The Dyas decision deliberately steered away from promul-
gating a rigid, general standard for distinguishing "private" and
"government," or "state" searches. In holding the Wright court's
"primary mission" test invalid, the court left itself free to deter-
mine, on a case-by-case basis, which public officials should be sub-ject to the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. Although
explicitly declining 'to delve into the issue of whether the exclu-
sionary rule should apply to evidence seized by private security
police or private investigators," the opinion leaves the distinct im-
pression that that question, too, may turn on the training, duties,
experience, or sophistication of the individual conducting the
search. At the core of the Dyas holding is a fundamental concern
for safeguarding the privacy of the general citizenry. The court
has paved the way for a broadened concept of state action, a con-
cept which may eventually include all private investigators and
security agencies. Conceivably, once some threshold test of state
involvement is met (such as state licensing of a private security
agency, or the mere fact that the fruits of a search and seizure
are used in a criminal prosecution), the dimensions of the exclu-
sionary rule will be measured in terms of a security organization's
capacity 'to violate individual privacy.45 By focusing its analysis
rest was a citizen's arrest under section 837 of the Penal Code, and that the searchincident thereto was thus a private search not subject to the exclusionary rule.The court concluded that, although illegal, the arrest was a citizen's arrest. In
noting that the resultant search of defendant's premises was tainted by the unlaw-ful arrest, the court added:
The seizure of the evidence during that alleged search must be realisti-
cally construed .... It was in the performance of their duties as offi-
cers and as employees and agents of the state .... Accordingly, the
search and seizure must be held . . . to have been within the proscrip-tions of both the state and federal constitutions.
43. See note 9 supra.
44. 11 Cal. 3d 628, 633, 522 P.2d 674, 77-78, 114 Cal. Rptr. 114, 117-18.The Dyas court reiterated the dictum of Stapleton v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d97, 100-01 n.3, 447 P.2d 967, 969 n.3, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575, 577 n.3 (1968):
We are not called upon to decide whether searches by private investiga-tors and private police forces should be held subject per se to the com-
mands of the fourth amendment on the ground that one of their basicpurposes is the enforcement of the law.45. Dyas can thus be interpreted as setting the stage for further extrapolation
of Stapleton's observation that:
searches by such well financed and highly trained organizations involve
a particularly serious threat to privacy. California statutes, moreover,
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upon the individual employee, and not the character of the agency
which employs him, the Dyas court seems to have taken a long
step toward holding private police forces to the same constitutional
standards imposed on public law enforcement agencies.
William E. Robinson
blur the line between public and private law enforcement.
70 Cal. 2d at 100-01 n.3, 447 P.2d at 969 n.3, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 577 n.3.
